The paper examines India"s experience with ITA. Initially, the main concern was to attract inward FDI and to facilitate the growth of its then still nascent IT services industry. For electronics manufacturing however, the analysis shows that gains from trade liberalization were overshadowed by substantial costs -with rising electronics imports inflating the country"s current account deficit to unsustainable record highs, while eroding domestic electronic manufacturing and innovation.
To improve reciprocity in the distribution of gains from ITA, the paper suggests that latecomers like India deserve, under certain conditions, special and differentiated treatment. In turn, these countries need to agree to reforms that reduce investment barriers in their domestic industries, such as restrictive regulations and discrimination against foreign direct investment. 
Overview of topic and why it is important
A defining characteristic of today"s international trading system is that plurilateral trade agreements ("plurilaterals") are gaining in importance relative to the gridlocked Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. Examples are the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 2 , the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), and the recent emphasis on megaregional trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIA) 3 .
In contrast to multilateral WTO agreements, where all WTO members are party to the agreement, a plurilateral agreement implies that WTO member countries have a choice to agree to new rules on a voluntary basis. Apart from getting around the "decision-making ordeal of the WTO", the main purpose of plurilateral agreements is to respond "to the changing needs of industries with agility" by "… [a]llowing flexibility in the choice of participants" 4 .
The resultant rising complexity of international trade rules poses new and so far little understood challenges not only for the governance of the international trading system but also for national policies that seek to enhance international competitiveness through productivity-enhancing industrial manufacturing and innovation.
We know even less about the challenges that those more selective trade agreements are going to pose for countries which are latecomers to industrial manufacturing and innovation 5 . Will plurilaterals help to accelerate latecomer industrial manufacturing and innovation by narrowing the gap in productivity and income relative to leading industrialized countries? Or will, as opponents from developing countries fear, "…their interests… be neglected as the major trading powers steam ahead without them, in the worst case potentially "imposing" plurilateral outcomes on them at some future date, …[while]… forging new standards that developing countries will find difficult to implement … with … implications for loss of market access" 6 ?
2 WTO-GPA opens up government procurement markets only to firms from signatory states and does not provide MFN treatment to non-members. 
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The paper seeks to shed light on this question, by examining India"s experience with trade liberalization through the Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The analysis focuses on ITA"s impact on manufacturing and innovation in India"s electronics industry 7 .
Some basic definitions are in order to establish that manufacturing and innovation are closely intertwined, especially in a technology-intensive industry like electronics. Innovations convert ideas, inventions, and discoveries into new products, services, processes, and business models. Radical breakthrough discoveries and inventions through scientific research are only the tip of the iceberg 8 . Of critical importance are "industrial innovations" that allow for new ways of manufacturing existing products (e.g. with new materials; 3D Printing) as well as for manufacturing new products derived from new ideas, discovery, and inventions (e.g., implanted sensors). This implies that a country can only aspire to become successful in industrial innovation if it has developed a strong manufacturing industry.
In short, without large-scale advanced manufacturing facilities which can draw on an integrated domestic industrial value chain, even the most sophisticated R&D capabilities are of little use to generate innovations. Recent research in the US demonstrates that excessive reliance on offshore manufacturing and the resultant decline in domestic manufacturing erodes the country"s industrial innovation system 9 . This finding applies even more to India"s electronics industry,
given that its reliance on imports and on offshore manufacturing (mainly in China) is extremely high.
India"s experience with trade liberalization through international trade agreements has two sides. Some sectors like IT services, car components and generic pharmaceuticals have clearly benefitted from India"s WTO membership. As far as electronics manufacturing is concerned however, an important finding of this paper is that the gains from trade liberalization were overshadowed by substantial costs 10 . The resultant inverted tariff structure has eroded domestic electronics manufacturing, stifled innovation, and boosted electronics imports, inflating the country"s current account deficit to unsustainable record highs. 11 In turn, a weakened and stagnating industrial manufacturing industry is severely constraining India"s innovation capacity in this industry.
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This finding raises interesting questions for the study of trade and innovation. One could for instance ask whether the Indian electronics industry would be in better shape today if India had not signed on to ITA, and if not, whether the main culprit would be domestic policy that failed to unblock the barriers to investment and growth in electronics manufacturing. The findings of the paper certainly do not exonerate the responsibility of the Indian Government. There is ample evidence that existing restrictive regulations and the largely dysfunctional implementation of support policies of the past have constrained investment and growth of India"s domestic electronics manufacturing 12 .
One could also ask whether the contraction of India"s electronics industry in response to trade liberalization has reduced India"s welfare, or whether this contraction simply indicates that an inefficient protected industry could no longer survive without fundamental transformations 13 .
Furthermore, a related question would be whether India"s progress in IT services, chip design and R&D outsourcing has benefitted from ITA and, if so, whether this could compensate for the negative performance of electronics manufacturing in terms of employment generation, capability development and productivity-enhancing innovation 14 . In addition, one could ask whether the findings of a negative impact of ITA are sector-specific, and are shaped by specific characteristics of electronics manufacturing 15 .
These are important questions but they are beyond the scope of this brief Think Piece that focuses on reforms of the multilateral trading systems that are conducive for the spread of industrial innovation. A central proposition is that the success or failure of trade liberalization is determined by the strength of a country"s economic institutions, its market size and sophistication, and the managerial and technological capabilities of its firms.
India indeed needs to overcome very substantial "latecomer disadvantages" that result from lagging behind major trading powers in the development of economic institutions and capabilities that are essential for advanced industrial manufacturing and innovation. As emphasized by Raghuram Rajan, India"s new Central Bank governor, India of course bears the primary responsibility for correcting the above latecomer disadvantages, and the government needs to better align domestic policies in order to unblock the barriers to investment and growth in the electronics industry 17 . In fact, as documented in the afore-mentioned World Bank study, the Indian government seeks to fast track the development of India"s electronics manufacturing industry through regulatory reform and industrial support policies.
Yet the challenge is such that, even under the best of circumstances, it would take a long time to substantially reduce the gap in costs and capabilities that currently separates India from the leading trading powers 18 . There is thus an urgent need for reforming the multilateral trading system. It is necessary to acknowledge the asymmetric effects that plurilateral agreements like ITA may have on cost structures and capabilities of latecomers like India.
If ITA fails to recognize the different stages of development of participants, this may result not just in zero sum but negative sum outcomes that may end up sparking serious trade conflicts. In line with Mari Pangestu"s suggestion, this paper thus argues that plurilateral agreements should allow for special and differential treatment of latecomers.
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Differential treatment of latecomers is especially important for the ITA which affects a substantial and rapidly growing part of international merchandise trade and FDI. ITA covers an industry that is an important source of innovation. And in many segments of this industry entry barriers are high due to demanding technology requirements. As long as no solution is found for the unequal distribution of ITA gains, it is unrealistic to expect further progress in trade liberalization in this industry which is critically important for the diffusion of productivityenhancing innovation.
Part two of the paper reviews conflicting perceptions of the distribution of trade liberalization gains. Part three highlights defining characteristics of latecomer economic development that set to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth", Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(1), pp. 37-74, March. 17 Rajan. R., 2013, Why India Slowed, 30 April, http://www.project-syndicate.org/print/the-democratic-roots-ofindia-s-economic-slowdown-by-raghuram-rajan 18 According to Partha Mukhopadhyay at New Delhi's Centre for Policy Research, policies to change tariff and duty structures are prey to serious conflicts of interest between the central government and the states, but they may be easier to implement than changing labor laws, while short-term infrastructure issues, like power and transportation could in principle be fixed or at least isolated in specialized clusters. The fundamental longer-term challenge however is to create and continuously upgrade an educated and skilled labor force that is needed to translate innovations into competitive products and services. (Email to the author, dated August 19, 2013) 19 According to Pangestu, plurilateral agreements "…should promote economic and technical cooperation recognising the different stages of development of participants. Special and differential treatment can be justified in circumstances where participants face challenges in benefitting from an increase in trade.", http://ictsd.org/publications/latest-pubs/dg2013/mari-pangestu/ India apart from the major trading powers in the information technology manufacturing industry. Part Four examines India"s experience with ITA-1, highlighting negative effects of the inverted tariff structure on import content, domestic production and value-added. Part Five discusses implications for India of a possible expansion of the product list to be covered by ITA-2. The paper concludes with a summary of findings and policy implications.
The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) -Conflicting Perceptions on the distribution of trade liberalization gains
The ITA went into effect in April 1997 with 29 WTO member countries and now includes 74 WTO members. 36 members are non-OECD member countries, and 35 of those are developing countries 20 . Apart from India, this includes large countries such as China, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, Turkey and Vietnam, and middle-income countries, such as Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand 21 . All of these countries have the potential to become players in the electronics industry. For these countries, the question matters whether ITA facilitates latecomer manufacturing and innovation 22 . India"s experience with ITA thus may provide important insights on necessary reforms of ITA that could help to better accommodate the need for special and differential treatment of those countries.
In its current form, ITA provides for zero tariffs for 217 electronics products 23 . The main product groups covered were computers, semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing and test equipment, telecommunications equipment, software, and scientific instruments 24 .
The US government was a major driving force behind the establishment of ITA. The agreement"s agenda was shaped by a core group of developed countries who accounted for nearly all of the original signatories, with Indonesia and Turkey the only developing countries formally adopting the Declaration. Unlike some other plurilateral trade agreements, such as the WTO-GPA (Government Procurement Agreement), which allows exceptions by way of offsets (e.g. defence offsets), the ITA does not allow any exception to the covered products. 
Latecomer Manufacturing and Innovation -Fundamental Flaws of India's electronics industry
The study of trade liberalization through plurilateral trade agreements needs to be nested in the larger context of latecomer manufacturing and innovation.
The distinction between "latecomers" and incumbent "leaders" who have accumulated "firstmover advantages" goes back to debates among economic historians on how "relative economic backwardness" in the 19 th century has shaped the patterns and strategies of industrialization of countries such as the US, Germany, Japan 33 The basic idea is that those who are behind have the potential to make a larger leap. According to a classical study, "the larger the technological and, therefore, the productivity gap between leader and follower, the stronger the follower's potential for growth in productivity: and, other things being equal, the faster one expects the follower's growth rate to be. Followers tend to catch up faster if they are initially more backward." (Abramovitz, 1989: p.221) same time however, empirical research has identified a great variety of entry barriers confronting industrial latecomers 34 .
India"s electronics industry provides ample examples of such latecomer disadvantages. Compared to its main competitors, local production struggles with substantial cost disadvantages ("disabilities") which constrain investment in plants and equipment, technology absorption, capability development and innovation. There is a huge gap between the rapid growth of domestic demand and the practically stagnant domestic production, and this gap is projected to increase further 35 .
A defining characteristic of India"s electronics market is that a handful MNCs dominate without engaging in substantial domestic manufacturing in India (whether directly or through EMSs), with the exception of low-value-added final assembly. Those MNCs can rely on their extended global production networks to source the relevant products for the Indian market from low-cost production sites, primarily in China 36 .
Where local Indian firms seek to compete with MNCs for the India market, they follow the same pattern of sourcing their products from offshore production sites in China. Indian firms thus have to compete on the "China price", relying on offshore outsourcing to China-based electronics manufacturing service providers (EMSs).
Given the weakness of domestic production, India"s growing domestic demand for electronic products results in rising imports, while bottlenecks abound across the industry"s value chain, causing excessive import dependence for key components. In 2011, imports counted for 63.6% of India"s consumption of electronics products, and 51% for electronic components. By 2015, the share of imports is expected to increase to 65% and 61% respectively (Frost & Sullivan, 2013).
India"s liberalization of information and telecom services has boosted the demand for telecom equipment, but this has not led to the development of a domestic telecom manufacturing industry. Instead, global telecom equipment vendors such as Alcatel, Ericcson, and increasingly Huawei and ZTE have been the primary beneficiaries. And consumer electronics, the largest segment of India"s electronics market is dominated by MNCs, especially Panasonic, Sony, LG, and Samsung. Over the last few years, these companies have substantially decreased domestic production, and rely now overwhelmingly on imports from China. As for domestic vendors, they are even less reliant on domestic production -they almost completely source from China.
It is important to emphasize that India"s thriving integrated circuit design sector remains largely disconnected from the India market. Most of the design work is done for MNCs and the design is taken back to their home country where decisions are made where to locate manufacturing, many times ending up in places like Shenzhen. As a result, India is not benefiting from its rich pool of sophisticated IC design engineers, as this pool remains disconnected from the development of the domestic electronics manufacturing industry.
In short, deep integration of electronic design capabilities into global R&D networks is paired in India with almost no integration into the domestic electronics manufacturing value chain. For instance, all major EDA tool providers for chip design have large facilities in India. But all of them are 100% focused on export markets. Hence, little of these capabilities are likely to disseminate within India.
India faces a fundamental challenge -its electronics industry cannot count so far on a vibrant industrial innovation system which in turn constrains its capacity for productivity-enhancing innovation. For many domestic firms, inadequate size prevents economies of scale and scope, while high costs of doing business, Byzantine regulations, and low domestic value-added constrain profit margins and hence investment in production and R&D. In addition, larger foreign OEMs and EMSs typically conduct only final assembly in India, and are reluctant to invest in full-scale manufacturing and R&D.
There is ample evidence that India"s R&D system remains stuck at a low level, unable to provide capabilities and innovations that would enable its electronics industry to reap the benefits of ITA liberalization. The most recent Global Innovation Index 2013 provides ample evidence of India"s weak industrial innovation capacity -India ranks 66, out of 142 countries, with a total score of 36.2. China on the other hand ranks 35, with a total score of 44.7 37 . According to the Battelle Institute, a primary source of international R&D date, India"s gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) was 0.85% of GDP in 2012 (compared to 1.6% in China), a figure essentially unchanged since 2000 38 .
Industrial research outputs in terms of patents, remain limited. India has one of the smallest ratios of scientists and engineers per million people (137/million people) compared to other countries in the region, such as China and South Korea, which produce larger numbers of engineers each year than any other countries in the world. This reflects the hugely variable quality of India"s higher education, ranging from excellent to inadequate 39 .
Most importantly, a crumbling basic education system and a persistently high adult illiteracy (32% for men, but 55% for women) indicate severe limitations to the quality of India"s workers who are needed to translate innovations into competitive products and services 40 .
In the final analysis, the misery of India"s electronics manufacturing industry points to a broader challenge. India"s economic institutions, both public and private, were largely designed for a time before India was opened to the global economy. These institutions are ill-equipped to cope with the requirements of transforming India into an internationally competitive industrial economy that could reap the benefits of ITA -related trade liberalization 41 .
India's experience with ITA
When India signed ITA in 1997, the main concern was to attract inward FDI and to facilitate the growth of its then still nascent IT services industry. ITA participation was also viewed as an important catalyst for extending further India"s liberalization drive.
At the same time however, India"s participation in ITA has acted as an important barrier to the development of India"s domestic electronics manufacturing industry. It is important to emphasize that India joined ITA from a position of weakness in this industry. The country was heavily relying on electronics imports, but had no significant domestic electronics industry. As part of the government"s liberalization drive, India actually volunteered quite substantial tariff concessions 42 . As joining ITA led to a reduction of India"s tariffs for final products to zero or close to zero, this has led to an acceleration of ITA imports. In 2000, 96 product lines were reduced to zero tariff, and in 2005, 121 product lines were reduced to zero tariff. While India"s ITA imports grew by 18% annually between 1997 to 2000, their growth rate increased to nearly 38% between 2001 and 2005. 45 An immediate impact has been an increase of the import content of the raw material consumption of India"s electronics industry over the last 7 years from 50.48% to 55.86% 46 .
This contrasts with
Furthermore, India"s electronics imports under HS code 85 have grown faster than India"s electronics consumption 47 48 . Between fy 2010-11 and fy 2012-13, India"s imports grew especially fast for integrated circuits (82.02%), the second largest electronics import category 49 .
In principle, trade deficits are not always negative for economic growth. In fact empirical research points to the importance of imports in boosting productivity 50 . Yet in India"s case, local value added of electronics manufacturing is around 7%, while electronics imports account for almost two thirds of India"s consumption of electronics products (Frost and Sullivan: 2013). These imports are a major driver of the country"s record current account deficit. Hence, positive productivity effects of rising imports are quite unlikely.
In addition, an analysis of the number of Triadic patent families by applicant"s country of residence shows that between 1999 and 2005, India recorded a measly total of 26 such patents. During the same period, China recorded 208 such patents, Korea 4862, and the US 37,907.
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In short, the Indian electronics industry has clearly not benefited from participation in the ITA. By implementing zero customs duty on 217 tariff lines of products and their inputs in 2003, ITA has significantly constrained local manufacturing and innovation. Any electronic product that Indian companies have shown competence in has its imported transistors, diodes or capacitors taxed at 14 per cent, while a finished item (such as STB"s or low-cost medical equipment) can be shipped in from China at zero per cent 52 .
Specifically, India"s inverted tariff structure has leds to a sharp decline in investments in the domestic production of components, raw materials, parts and even electronic sub-assemblies. As a result, the share of domestically manufactured electronic components in India"s component consumption has declined from over 50% in 2005 to an estimated 43% in 2013 53 .
The erosion of domestic electronics manufacturing has drastically increased India"s trade deficit in electronics products. For 2009 and 2010, India"s average trade deficit for ITA products was $ 15.54 billion, equaling almost 70 % of India"s average trade deficit 54 .
In short, as far as trade is concerned, the costs of ITA for India seem to have substantially exceeded any gains. More importantly, ITA has acted as a fundamental barrier to developing India"s domestic electronics manufacturing industry and its innovation capacity. Some observers fear that, with the influx of imports into the domestic markets, due to the zero tariff under the ITA, "…the existing domestic producers may become domestic assemblers and traders in the IT products." (Kallummal, 2012: p. 15) In fact, India faces a double whammy: While ITA-related tariff reductions have led to a sharp decline in investments in domestic electronics manufacturing, exports from India at the same time face substantial technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in the US, the EU and Japan 55 . According to recent research, the US, the EU and Japan appear to be the main drivers behind the surge in NTBs and TBTs -Of the total of 456 TBT notifications from 1995 to 2000 by all WTO members, developed countries have submitted 356 notifications, i.e. 78% of the total notifications (Kallumal, 2012: pages 17 ff).
Implications for India of a possible expansion of ITA
In July 2013, ITA members were negotiating in Geneva a possible substantial expansion of the list of products covered by ITA.The Indian government decided not to join the Geneva ITA-2 negotiations 56 .The Indian Government argues that a small group of developed country 60 . The Chamber argues that merely resisting the ITA expansion is unlikely to have positive effects for India"s electronics industry. Instead, the Indian government should engage in a smart strategy of co-shaping the consolidated product list of ITA-2: "India needs to address the ITA expansion, weighing carefully its long-term as well as short-term objectives in a strategic manner rather than becoming overly influenced by ad hoc approaches and concerns." (ASSOCHAM National WTO Council: p.8)
In this view, non-participation in ITA-2 negotiations comes at a heavy cost. Not only would India lose the option of co-shaping the contents of the new expanded ITA product list. Nonparticipation might also discourage international investors to expand their presence in India, and it might act as a disincentive for existing FDI manufacturing projects to expand and upgrade their facilities.
A close look at the outcome of the July 2013 ITA-2 negotiations in Geneva however raises doubts whether India would have had realistic chances to co-shape the expanded ITA-2 product list. In fact, China was precisely trying to implement such a co-shaping negotiation strategy, but the result of the Geneva meeting was not encouraging. Before the Geneva meeting, China presented a list of sensitive products that called for the removal of 106 products rather than asking for an extended implementation period (so-called "staging"). Under pressure to shorten this list, China on July 17 reduced the list of sensitive products that it wanted not to be part of the ITA-2 to around 90. China"s revised list of sensitive products included two product groups that are among the US priorities for ITA-2: MCOs and medical devices. India faces a similar, albeit more pressing dilemma. If ITA-2 would indeed broaden the product list to include MCOs and medical equipment, this will most likely close any realistic chances for India to develop significant domestic manufacturing capabilities in these subsectors.
Conclusions
Plurilateral trade agreements, such as the ITA, in principle could strengthen the multilateral trading system, by reducing barriers to trade that have not been adequately addressed in multilateral trade negotiations. From a global welfare perspective, such trade expansion could reinforce the diffusion of innovation 62 .
However, this would require reciprocity in the distribution of gains from the ITA. As this think piece demonstrates, it will not be easy to establish such reciprocity between countries at different stages of development and with different economic institutions. An important finding is that, as far as domestic production, innovation and trade in electronics products is concerned, the costs of India"s ITA participation seem to have substantially exceeded any gains. Current attempts to broaden the ITA list of products need to acknowledge that, without such reciprocity, it would be unrealistic to expect further progress in trade liberalization in this important and rapidly growing industry.
As India"s experience with ITA demonstrates, the study of trade liberalization through plurilateral trade agreements needs to be nested in the larger context of latecomer industrial manufacturing and innovation. To broaden our knowledge of the overall effects of such trade agreements, it is important to conduct an impact analysis for other developing countries that have joined ITA. Such research is necessary to determine under what conditions special and differential treatment might be advisable.
Governments obviously need to make every effort to unblock barriers to growth and innovation through regulatory reform and industrial support policies. At the same time however, plurilateral trade agreements will strengthen the multilateral trading system only if they provide solutions for the asymmetric effects on cost structure and capabilities of different participants.
Policy Implications
1. By reducing barriers to trade in the critically important information and communications technology industry, the ITA could play an important role in facilitating the diffusion of innovation. This however would require reciprocity in the distribution of gains from trade liberalization.
2. The international community should acknowledge that participants in the ITA differ in their stage of development, their institutions, and their resources and capabilities. This may result in an unequal distribution of trade liberalization gains. Hence, developing countries who are latecomers to electronics manufacturing and innovation may not be able to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers at the same speed as leading economies.
3. All participants in current negotiations about an expanded ITA product list have a common interest in avoiding zero game or even negative game outcomes and the resultant trade conflicts. This implies that serious efforts are required to reduce asymmetric impacts of ITA. Thus, latecomers may deserve, under certain conditions, special and differential treatment. Such conditions may include a significant increase in the country"s current account deficit due to rapidly rising imports; very high negative employment effects due to industry contraction; and negative effects on the effected industry"s innovation capacity 63 .
4. An immediate and relatively easy response would be to extend the transition period during which latecomers can identify certain specified products as sensitive so that they qualify for a phased-in period of tariff reduction.
